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I. INTRODUCTION
The conventional wisdom is that entrepreneurs seek financing for their
high-growth, high-risk start-up companies in a particular order. They be-
gin with friends, family, and "bootstrapping" (e.g., credit card debt). Next
they turn to angel investors, or accredited investors (and usually ex-entre-
preneurs) who invest their own money in multiple, early-stage start-ups.
Finally, after angel funds run dry, entrepreneurs seek funding from ven-
ture capitalists (VCs), whose deep pockets and connections lead the start-
up to an initial public offering (IPO) or sale to a larger company in the
same industry (trade sale).
That conventional wisdom may have been the model for start-up suc-
cess in the past, but this Article challenges its continuing applicability. In
particular, this Article argues that some start-ups that attract angel fund-
ing should stop there, rejecting offers of venture capital. It challenges the
notion that venture capital is a necessary condition for start-up success and
argues the counterintuitive proposition that venture capital may actually
be harmful to entrepreneurs and angel investors in some situations.
At the outset, I observe that angels are now able to fund certain start-
ups from their early stages to exit, both because start-ups need less money
and because angels can provide more of it. First, the cost of innovation is
decreasing in some technology sectors, most notably software. Second,
the rise of professional angel investment groups allows angels to better
tackle deal flow and lowers the transaction costs of pooling capital for
larger deals. Angel money can now substitute for VCs funding in some
start-ups, and while VCs have traditionally provided unique value-added
* Associate Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School. My thanks to
participants in an Emory faculty colloquium, the Illinois Corporate Colloquium, and to
Raulee Marcus of the Tech Coast Angels for helpful feedback on this Article. This Article
includes summaries of arguments I have made in other work. For brevity, rather than repeat
all citations here, the Article refers readers to my previous works where applicable.
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services that enable start-ups to go public, that path to exit has not existed
for most start-ups since the late 1990s) Further, angels offer their own
value-added services that enable start-ups to achieve smaller-dollar (rela-
tively speaking) trade-sale exits-the far more common exit route these
days and probably the better route for most investors.
After describing new realities that make angel-only financing of start-
ups possible, I explore three reasons that also make them more probable
going forward. First, with the negative and perhaps lasting changes to IPO
markets over the past decade, trade-sale exits have taken on increased
prominence. VCs, however, may actually impede smaller-dollar trade-sale
exits that would be desirable to angels and entrepreneurs because they do
not produce a large enough return on investment for VCs. As angels and
entrepreneurs experience the "lock-in" effect of venture capital (i.e., illi-
quidity from the VC's desire to "swing for the fences" on exit), they are
more likely to pass on VC involvement in future deals.
Second, from a corporate governance perspective, angel-only start-ups
can lower the transaction costs and agency costs of VC involvement. VCs
create these problems by investing in preferred stock, as opposed to the
entrepreneur's common stock. Angels, on the other hand, have long held
the same common stock as entrepreneurs, which aligns their incentives. It
is only with the recent rise of professional angel groups that angels have
moved into preferred stock - a move motivated in part by the need to
protect themselves from VCs. 2 Without VCs, angels would only have to
worry about protecting themselves against opportunistic entrepreneurs,
and angels have informal means of protection available to them that re-
duce the need for preferred stock's formal protections. Moreover, without
VCs, start-ups could even begin to organize as LLCs rather than C corpo-
rations, which would increase investor tax advantages on losses (although
increase tax burdens on certain gains). 3
Finally, from a social-welfare perspective, angel-only start-ups allow
broader geographic distribution of innovation-based gains beyond Silicon
Valley. Angel-only start-ups do not have to move their headquarters and
operations to be close to VCs. Instead, these start-ups can remain
anchored in the states where they began. Indeed, many states have eco-
nomic development plans that emphasize entrepreneurship. 4 This Article
1. See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
2. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61
VAND. L. RLzv. 1405, 1443 (2008) (supporting the proposition that angel groups acquire pre-
ferred stock more often than angels traditionally have); Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor,
Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 967, 973 (2006)
(arguing that the risk of VCs' opportunism may increase the price of angel financing, which
suggests a need for angels to defend themselves from VCs).
3. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Terrance P. McGuire, A Blueprint for Growth or a Recipe for Disaster?
State Sponsored Venture Capital Funds for High Technology Ventures, 7 HARV. J. L. & Trrcli.
419, 427 (1994) (noting that Massachusetts and Michigan have state venture capital funds to
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argues that angel-only financing should be an important part of that
conversation.
After exploring these three upsides of angel-only financing for start-
ups that can get by with less capital, this Article concludes with two cave-
ats for start-ups that consider going this route. First, there may be adverse
tax consequences to employees in start-ups without VC investment in pre-
ferred stock, which could mean more difficulty attracting talent. Second,
venture debt, an important but more obscure source of funding for start-
ups, may no longer be available to start-ups that shun VCs, as venture
debt's business model depends on venture capital. Despite these caveats
(which I show are less worrisome than they initially appear), I predict that
we will see more angel-only start-ups going forward, given the previously
unexplored advantages that rejecting venture capital can bring.
II. Two MAIN SOURCES OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE: ANGEL
INVESTORS AND VENTURE CAPITALISTS
Once entrepreneurs attempting to grow their start-ups exhaust the
funds available from friends, family, and their own accounts, they turn to
professional investors. Most market investors are not interested in fund-
ing start-ups due to their lack of a track record, high failure rate, and lack
of liquidity. However, two types of investors do specialize in these invest-
ments: angel investors and VCs.
Angel investors are typically the first source of outside funding for
start-ups. Although it is difficult to pin down exactly who constitutes an
angel investor, a broad understanding includes anyone who invests his or
her personal funds in a new business. 5 Conceivably, this makes even fam-
ily members angel investors, and it does not limit the subjects of their in-
vestments to rapid-growth (as opposed to "lifestyle") 6 businesses.
Therefore, a more limited, more apt definition of angel investor - and the
one employed in this Article - is an "accredited investor" who invests in
multiple, early-stage start-ups. 7 Angel investors are usually also ex-entre-
preneurs who have successfully exited their own start-ups. For example,
support entrepreneurship that are "widely regarded as the premier programs in the . . .
field").
5. For a fuller description of angels and VCs, including literature citations, see
Ibrahim, supra note 2, at 1406-07.
6. A typical lifestyle business is a "mom-and-pop" shop that does not have - or desire
- a rapid-growth trajectory, but instead starts small and stays small.
7. Individual investors with over $1 million in net worth count as accredited investors.
The Dodd-Frank Act changed the definition to exclude an individual's primary residence
from the net worth calculation, thus reducing the number of individuals who count as accred-
ited investors. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
101-203, § 413 (a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1577 (2010) ("The Commission shall adjust any net worth
standard for an accredited investor ... so that the individual net worth of any natural person,
or joint net worth with the spouse of that person, at the time of purchase, is more than
$1,000,000... excluding the value of the primary residence of such natural person .... ). The
Dodd-Frank Act also requires the SEC to review the accredited investor definition every
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Facebook's angel investors include Peter Thiel (co-founder of PayPal) and
Reid Hoffman (co-founder of Linkedln).8 Angels invest in both technol-
ogy-based and non-technology based start-ups.9 They might invest alone
or with an informal syndicate of other angels, per the traditional practice,
or, increasingly, as members of organized angel investment groups that
have sprouted up throughout the United States over the past decade.1 0
While angels invest their personal funds in early-stage start-ups, VCs
are professional investors who put other people's money to work once
starts-ups have had some time (usually a year or two) to develop." VCs
are actually the general partners of large funds organized as limited part-
nerships, with endowments and pension funds serving as the funds' limited
partners.' 2 Limited partners' committed capital is drawn upon as needed
to invest in particular start-ups. 13 VCs have backed most start-ups that
have gone on to fame and fortune over the past several decades, including
Facebook (VCs Accel Partners and Greylock Partners) and Google (VCs
Kleiner Perkins and Sequoia Capital).' 4 Both VCs and angel investors
contribute important value-added services, such as seasoned advice and
connections, in addition to money.
III. Do START-UPS NEED VENTURE CAPITAL?
A. Conventional Wisdom
The conventional wisdom is that while angels are a plus, start-ups need
venture capital to succeed. This is because VCs have deeper pockets than
angels and because, as mentioned, they contribute important value-added
four years and make adjustments "as the Commission may deem appropriate for the protec-
tion of investors, in the public interest, and in light of the economy." Id. at § 413 (b).
8. Ryan Mac, Ryan Hoffman and Peter Thiel in Conversation: Their Biggest Misses,
FORBES (May 2, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2012/05/02/reid-hoffman-and-
peter-thiel-in-conversation-the-biggest-misses/.
9. Robert Wiltbank, At the Individual Level: Outlining Angel Investing in the United
States, UNIV. OF ILL. AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN'S ACAD. FOR ENTREPRIENEURIAL LEADIR-
SHIP HISTORICAL RESEARCH RIEFRENCE IN ENTREPRENEURSIHIP, 4, available at http://www.
marketingtechie.com/articles/angel-investing.pdf (observing that angels invest in "computer-
related, health-care-related, or non-technology investments," depending on their particular
areas of expertise).
10. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
11. See Ibrahim, supra note 2, at 1450 (noting that angel groups, like angels, "still
invest[ ] their own money).
12. Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. RE~v. 1, 8
(2012).
13. See id.
14. Eric Savitz, Facebook: Some Venture Investors are Moving On, FORBES (Aug. 20,
2012, 5:58 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericsavitz/2012/08/20/facebook-some-venture-in-
vestors-are-moving-on/ (noting that Accel Partners and Greylock Partners have sold posi-
tions in Facebook since its initial public offering); see also http://googlepress.blogspot.com/
1999/06/google-receives-25-million-in-equity.html (noting the early investments in Google by
Kleiner Perkins and Sequoia Capital).
Spring 2013] Should Angel-Backed Start-Ups Reject Venture Capital? 255
services, especially those designed to position the start-up to go public.
First, VCs offer considerable funding for growing start-ups - including an
initial investment of millions of dollars.' 5 Further, VCs and their syndi-
cate partners typically follow on these initial investments several times
over, to the tune of tens of millions of dollars, as the start-up progresses.1 6
These large-dollar contributions allow capital-intensive start-ups to move
through their initial development stage into product testing, then expan-
sion mode, and eventually to exit.
Second, VCs offer value-added services designed to transform start-
ups from small, technology-proving enterprises into large companies deliv-
ering those technologies to a large marketplace. While the entrepreneur's
talents may have been crucial to envision and prove the start-up's technol-
ogy at inception, professional managers are often needed once the start-up
enters its expansion phase.' 7 VCs have connections, through past working
relationships and otherwise, with professional managerial talent specializ-
ing in these transitions.
Because VC money and value-added services are thought to be so val-
uable, I have written about how angels structure their investments in start-
ups to invite follow-on VC participation.' 8 For starters, before the rise of
angel groups, angels routinely accepted the same common stock as entre-
preneurs.1 9 Traditionally, angels have also often foregone board seats and
other contractual protections that VCs demand. 20 At first glance, this
seems odd since angels need more protection than VCs, not less, because
they invest when the start-up is brand new. However, the answer to the
puzzle of non-aggressive angel contracts becomes clear when considering
that angels are contemplating their interactions not just with entrepre-
neurs and other angels, but with the potential VCs they hope will later
become investors.
15. Jeffrey E. Sohl, The U.S. Angel and Venture Capital Market: Recent Trends and
Developments, 6 J. P-IVATE EQuriy 7, 15 (2003) (noting that typical investment sizes for
later-stage VC investments were between 10 and 15 million dollars and "steadily
increasing").
16. See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Str6mberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the
Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD.
281, 304 (2003) for a more thorough discussion of VC financing stages.
17. eBay, for example, primarily sought venture capital because it recognized that a
VC's connections and expertise would be essential in securing a seasoned CEO and other
executives. RANIAI_ E. SItI.oss, EBoys: Titi TtZut STORY OF TlE Six TALL MEN WI-O
BACKED EBAY AND Oriniz Bitt ON-DoLAR STARr-Uts 22 (2000).
18. For a fuller account of this argument, including literature citations, see Ibrahim,
supra note 2, at 1428-30. It should be noted that the entrepreneurial finance model in the
United States is largely one of private ordering. By contrast, in the United Kingdom, the
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) is a public market matching risk capital and entrepre-
neurs. I plan to compare these two models of venture capital in a forthcoming paper.
19. See id. at 1422.
20. Id. at 1423.
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Angels have traditionally designed their investment contracts in a non-
aggressive way in order to attract VCs. "VCs are flooded with funding
proposals, and accept maybe one ...percent" of the serious ones.2 1 A
start-up with angels on the board, with preferred stock, and other bells and
whistles is unattractive to VCs, as VCs will be forced to "unwind" aggres-
sive angel preferences to strike the VCs' standard deal. In other words,
VCs will take their usual board seats, preferences on liquidation, and so
forth in each investment. If angels are already getting what the VCs want,
the VCs must convince the angels to restructure their deal or the VCs will
get less. Because this negotiation and unwinding is costly and time-inten-
sive, VCs considering numerous investment candidates may pass on these
particular start-ups.
Things are a bit different for angel groups. Their members invest more
capital slightly later in the process than traditional angels and have rela-
tionships with VCs - all of which make their participation worth the extra
hassle. 22 Angel groups are more plugged into local VC communities, ei-
ther through pre-existing relationships or because a steady deal flow
quickly makes them repeat players in start-up financing. Because of the
angel group-VC relationships and angel group members' greater sophisti-
cation, these angels may value the start-up more realistically for their in-
vestment, thus doing some of the legwork that VCs would otherwise have
to do to get the entrepreneur to be more realistic about the start-ups' cur-
rent value.2 3 VCs may even refer early-stage deals to angels, and then
screen the start-up again after the angels' investment helps the start-up
develop. For these reasons, VCs view angel groups like other VCs, and
allow them to contract with the start-ups accordingly.24
B. New Realities
While the conventional wisdom, as outlined above, is that angels and
entrepreneurs will need to attract VCs for their deep pockets and connec-
tions, new realities could lead to a new trend: start-ups that choose to ac-
cept angel backing only. The first new reality is that deep pockets may no
longer be as important to the start-up equation. In one important technol-
ogy sector-software-the cost of innovation has come down dramatically
over the past decade. As one prominent VC recently wrote, "[t]he
software VC business has been fundamentally altered by the massive de-
crease in the cost of building and launching a software based business."'2 5
21. Id. at 1428.
22. For a discussion of VCs' aversion to aggressive angel deals, see id. at 1429.
23. VCs' most common complaint about traditional angels is that they, like entrepre-
neurs, overvalue early-stage start-ups. See Ibrahim, supra note 2, at 1429
24. Still, even the newer angel group contracts do not contain all of the typical VC
contract provisions. Id. at 1446-47.
25. Fred Wilson, There are Two Venture Capital Industries, AVC: MUSINGS OF A VC
IN NYC (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.avc.com/a-vc/2OlO/09/there-are-two-venture-capital-in-
dustries.html.
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The hottest technology sector of late seems to be media and entertain-
ment, based on the examples of companies such as Facebook and Twit-
ter.26 Purely digital media and entertainment start-ups can similarly be
launched with very little capital. 27 While scaling them to the mass market-
place requires more capital, that can be sought post-exit (for example, by
selling shares in an IPO).
At the same time that innovation costs are decreasing, angel capital
appears to be increasing. Angels now have the resources necessary to
fund software and digital media start-ups from their early stages to exit
without VC dollars. The past decade has seen the formation of hundreds
of professional angel investment groups throughout the country. 28 These
groups attract the most serious angels in a community and enable them to
pool their capital with fewer transaction costs. 29 This leads to a larger
pool of angel money that can be made available to start-ups selected by
the angel group members to receive funding.30
Of course, there are other technology sectors where venture capital is
still very much a necessity. These capital-intensive fields (as opposed to
"capital-efficient" fields like software) include the life sciences and clean
technology industries. 31 Start-ups in these fields have substantially larger
capital requirements than angels can provide, even with their capital
pooled in angel groups. My points are only that 1) certain start-ups can
now make do with less funding, and 2) certain angels can now provide
more of it. This combination of factors has led to the new possibility of
angel-only start-ups, at least as far as funding is concerned.
Even if angels are now capable of funding certain start-ups alone, VCs
will still assert their necessity for the value-added services they provide,
such as ramping up the company for an IPO. As I have argued elsewhere,
however, VCs can no longer credibly claim that their involvement will in-
crease the probability of an IPO exit. 32 IPO markets have not rebounded
since the gold rush of the late 1990s and 2000. After 271 VC-backed IPOs
26. This is not a claim for which I have empirical evidence, only anecdotal evidence.
27. See Email from Fred Wilson, a prominent angel investor, to author (Sept. 10, 2012)
(noting that media start-ups like Facebook and Twitter "can be started for almost no
money") (on file with author).
28. See ANGI] CAPrrAl ASSOCIATION, http://www.angelcapitalassociation.org/direc-
tory/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2013), for a current listing of angel groups that are members of the
Angel Capital Association, the North American trade association of angel groups.
29. See Ibrahim, supra note 2, at 1443 (the most serious angels may flock to angel
groups because of "increased opportunities for interaction with other angels and venture
capitalists, the chance to fund larger deals through the pooling of resources, and the ability to
invest in amounts large enough to justify the transaction costs of preferred stock").
30. Id. at 1445 ("The increased opportunities for pooling also may facilitate larger
investments.").
31. Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WAS[. U. L. Ri v. 717,
748 (2010).
32. For a fuller account of this argument, including literature citations, see Ibrahim,
supra note 12, at 10-13.
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in 1999 and 263 in 2000, the numbers dropped to six and twelve IPOs in
2008 and 2009, respectively. 33 The financial crisis reduced investor appe-
tite for new issuances, and though the numbers for 2010 and 2011 are bet-
ter (75 and 53 VC-backed IPOs, respectively), 34 they still represent only a
small fraction of start-ups that angels and VCs fund. They still represent
only a small fraction of start-ups that angels and VCs fund. By contrast,
the number of trade-sale exits is steadily rising over the same time period
- 237 in 1999 and 317 in 2000, jumping to 442 in 2010 and 458 in 2011. 3 5
Whether the number of IPOs will ever fully rebound to previous levels
remains to be seen. Passed after the IPO gold rush, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 (SOX) has been blamed for making IPOs too expensive for
most young tech firms.36 While small public companies have now been
exempted from the particularly onerous accounting rules of SOX section
404,3 7 the accounting firm Grant Thornton argues that the IPO crisis be-
gan even before Sarbanes-Oxley. 38 Grant Thorton cites the regulatory
change of recording stock spreads in increments of $0.01 per share instead
of the former fractional system with spreads of $0.25 per share. 39 Market
makers and traders used to cover smaller public companies because of the
greater profit margin in smaller spreads, even at smaller volumes, but now,
as Grant Thorton argues, "[i]n a hyper-efficient market, where trading
spreaders and commissions are approaching zero, the company needs to
be large enough to attract research and investors."' 40 Other post-gold rush
rules including the "Manning Rule," Order Handling Rules, and Regula-
tion FD (Fair Disclosure) 41 may have also contributed to a forever-
changed IPO market.
Finally, the highest-profile VC-backed IPO to take place in some time
- Facebook - has been a flop. Facebook went public on May 18, 2012 with
33. See 2012 NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION YEARBOOK, NVCA 52
(April 2012) [hereinafter NVCA YEARBOOK 2012], available at http://www.nvca.org/index.
php?option=com content&view=article&id=257&Itemid=103.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 55.
36. See, e.g., Dale A. Oesterle, The High Costs of IPOs Depresses Venture Capital in
the United States, 1 ENTR.EPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 369, 370 (2006) ("The higher ongoing costs
are a significant bone of contention, particularly with the implementation of Section 404 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.").
37. The Dodd-Frank Act added section 404 (c) to SOX. This provision permanently
exempts small companies (those with a public float less than $75 million) from SOX section
404 (b). In 2010, the SEC amended its rules to conform them to the new section 404 (c). See
SEC Internal Control Over Financial Reporting in Exchange Act Periodic Reports of Non-
Accelerated Filers, 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 229, 249 (2010).
38. David Weild & Edward Kim, Market Structure is Causing the IPO Crisis-and
More, GRANT TH-ORNTrON 7 (June 2010), http://www.gt.com/staticfiles//GTCom/Public%20
companies%20and %20capital%20markets/Files/IPO %20crisis%20- %20June%202010%20-
%20FINAL.pdf.
39. See id. at 10.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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an offering price of $38 per share, which valued the company at a stagger-
ing $100 billion.42 On Friday September 7, 2012, the stock closed at a
mere $18.96 per share.43 While the story is still to be written on everything
that went wrong with this offering, one thing is clear - the Facebook flop is
not the picture-perfect exit that will pave an easy road to public offering
riches for other start-ups. Further, venture capital is becoming even more
a model segregated between top funds, which raise considerable capital to
invest in the hottest start-ups, and lower-tier funds, which (by number)
fund the vast majority of start-ups, but whose ability to raise and invest
funds is down considerably. 44 In the aggregate, the National Venture Cap-
ital Association (NVCA) reports that the "activity level of the U.S. ven-
ture capital industry is around half what it was at the 2000-era peak. '4 5
Less funding for the majority of start-ups means even fewer IPO
prospects.
With IPOs now more scarce, the trade-sale exit (being acquired by a
larger company in the same industry) becomes the start-up's most promis-
ing exit opportunity. As discussed in the next Part, it is not nearly so clear
that start-ups need VCs to obtain trade-sale exits, and for reasons that will
be explored below, VCs may actually be detrimental to achieving desira-
ble trade-sale exits from the entrepreneur's and angel's perspectives.
IV. WHY ANGEL-ONLY START-UPS MAY NOT ONLY BE POSSIBLE, BUT
ALSO PROBABLE
Having established that some angel-only start-ups are possible, the
question remains: are they are preferable, either from an investor perspec-
tive, a social welfare perspective, or both? This Section gives three rea-
sons why some start-ups that attract angel financing should stop there,
rejecting offers of venture capital that may come their way. Before pro-
ceeding, however, it is important to note that at this point my argument
for angel-only start-ups is purely normative. That is, it is prescriptive, not
descriptive. I am not trying to show that angel-backed start-ups do reject
venture capital; I am only making the counterintuitive argument that some
of them should. With the purely normative nature of my argument in
mind, here are three advantages to start-ups that choose to reject venture
capital.
42. Sean Hollister, Facebook sets IPO at $38 a share, confirming a valuation of $100
billion, Titi Vui-uc& (May 17, 2012, 4:18 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2012/5/17/3027211/
facebook-confirms-100-billion-ipo-at-38-a-share.
43. FB Historical, YAHoo! FINANCEI, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=FB&a=08&b=
7&c=2012&d=08&e=7&f=2012&g=d (last visited Feb. 5, 2013, 5:10 PM).
44. NVCA YEARBOOK 2012, supra note 33, at 10 ("A significant portion of the [VC]
fundraising [in 2010 and 2011] was done by several large, established firms. For many ven-
ture firms, especially those without established successful track records, it was very difficult
to raise money.").
45. Id. at 9.
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A. Advantage #1: Earlier Trade-Sale Exits
When start-ups take on venture capital, they change the exit equation
considerably. While the conventional wisdom is that VCs push for earlier
exits to return money to fund investors, and entrepreneurs resist because
they extract private benefits from running their start-ups without public
markets or a larger company to answer to, I challenge that argument in a
recent Article. 46 Following the lead of prominent angel investor Basil Pe-
ters,4 7 I contend that it is the exact opposite: entrepreneurs (and angels)
actually prefer earlier exits, while VCs want to wait for something more.
Trade sales valued at even a few million dollars benefit early investors
like entrepreneurs and angels because they paid so little for their stock.
Angel and entrepreneur common stock is cheap for two reasons: 1) com-
mon stock has fewer preferences; and 2) entrepreneurs and angels invest
when the start-up is very young and unproven, which translates to a low
valuation.
Unlike VCs, entrepreneurs and angels also have important non-finan-
cial objectives in mind. Some successful entrepreneurs are "serial" entre-
preneurs, meaning that they go on to found multiple start-ups.48 Early
trade sales give serial entrepreneurs both financial and human capital to
redeploy. Angels, likewise, invest for more than money, including the
thrill of being part of a new venture, but without the responsibility that
comes with being on the entrepreneurial team.4 9 Angels get the greatest
chance to participate in venture development in an early-stage start-up.
Once the start-up ramps up and VCs are involved, the angels' roles be-
come passive, waiting for an exit and monetary return. Therefore, the an-
gel who likes to be an active participant prefers a quick trade-sale exit that
allows her to fund-and participate in-other ventures.
The VC picture is quite different. First, VCs do not invest for non-
financial reasons, and even if they enjoy participation in venture develop-
ment, that participation takes place in the later stages. From a financial
perspective - which is the sole reason why VCs invest - the same trade
sale that paid off big for common stockholders pays off far less for VCs as
preferred stockholders. The VC stock was bought at a time when the start-
up was more developed (and thus more expensive), and preferred stock's
preferences don't come cheap.5 0 The different economics for VCs lead
them to pass on the small-dollar trade sales and "swing for the fences in
46. For a fuller account of this argument, including literature citations, see Ibrahim,
supra note 12, at 27-29.
47. BASIL PETERS, EARL Y EXITS: EXIT STRATEGIES I-OR ENTREPR ENEURS ANI) AN-
GFEL INVESTOR-S (BuT MAYBE NOT VENTURE CAPITALISTS) (1.2 ed. 2009).
48. For an interesting take on first-time versus serial entrepreneurs, see Fred Wilson,
First Time vs. Serial Entrepreneurs, AVC: MUSINGS OF A VC IN NYC (May 1, 2011), http://
www.avc.com/a-vc/2011/05/first-time-vs-serial-entrepreneurs.html.
49. For a fuller account of the angel participation argument, including literature cita-
tions, see Ibrahim, supra note 2, at 1437-40.
50. See id. at 1414-15.
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the hopes of an IPO or larger trade sale. . .. -51 The effect is to "lock in"
entrepreneurs and angels beyond their desired exit timeframes.
Although the NVCA does not publish statistics on the average age of a
start-up at trade sale, it does publish the average age at IPO. Start-ups
exited through IPO at an average age of 4.3 and 5.3 years in 1999 and
2000, respectively. 52 In the last three years, however, those times have
doubled (10.3 years in 2009; 9.2 years in 2010; and 8.2 years in 2011),53
suggesting that the lock-in effect of venture capital may be very real.
Because IPOs and high-dollar trade sales are more difficult to achieve
than small-dollar trade sales, even after waiting, the entrepreneur's and
angel's returns might not materialize at all. In fact, because of the liquida-
tion preferences embedded in VC preferred stock, angels and entrepre-
neurs may be shut out of the gains from any eventual exit.54 Therefore,
VC involvement can 1) contribute to a net entrepreneurial loss to society
by keeping entrepreneurs and angels locked into one enterprise; and 2) be
harmful to other investors. In sum, from an investor perspective, and even
perhaps a social welfare perspective, the lock-in effect of venture capital is
the first reason that angel-backed start-ups should think twice about bring-
ing in VCs.
B. Advantage #2: Corporate Governance: Reduced Transaction Costs
and Agency Costs
The second reason that angel-backed start-ups should consider re-
jecting VCs is that, from a corporate governance perspective, VC invest-
ment involves high transaction costs and agency costs due to VC
investment in preferred stock, as opposed to common stock.55 As ex-
plained below, dual-class stock creates corporate governance problems
that do not exist in start-ups with only a single class of stock. Worse cor-
porate governance is detrimental to the start-up's investors and perhaps to
society as a whole, to the extent that we believe that entrepreneurial firms
have a broader social value in terms of job creation, economic growth, and
otherwise.
First, as I have previously argued, the VC's preferred stock adds signif-
icant complexity to the relationship, increasing the costs of VC invest-
ment. 56 Under costly contracting theory, VCs' larger investments and
51. Ibrahim, supra note 12, at 29.
52. See NVCA Y.ARBOOK 2012, supra note 33, at 52.
53. Id.
54. See Brian J. Broughman, The Role of Independent Directors in Startup Firms, 2010
UTrAHI L. Ritv. 461, 466 (2010) (explaining that a liquidation preference means that when the
start-up "is sold or dissolved, preferred stockholders are entitled to be paid the full amount
of their liquidation preference before common shareholders receive anything. The liquida-
tion preference usually equals the amount invested ('IX preferences') but can be a multiple
of that amount and may include unpaid dividends.").
55. Ibrahim, supra note 2, at 1422.
56. Id. at 1434.
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fund investors justify taking preferred stock. 57 But this also adds transac-
tion costs for entrepreneurs and angels at the time of contracting. Stan-
dard form contracts found in law firm databases and available on the
NVCA websites minimize these transaction costs, 5 8 but each VC round
will involve different preferences relative to previous and future rounds,
and these must still be negotiated.
Second, the VC's preferred stock creates considerable agency costs for
entrepreneurs and angels, including the risk of opportunism. 5 9 Jesse Fried
and Mira Ganor have discussed the unusual governance scheme in start-
ups. That is, while common shareholders control most corporations, VCs
control start-ups through their preferred stock, at least after a few rounds
of financing. 60 While it might appear that fiduciary duty law might con-
strain VCs from abusing this control, an important Delaware case suggests
otherwise. In Orban v. Field, the Delaware court allowed VCs to sell a
start-up for an amount less than their liquidation preference, leaving the
common shareholders without a payout.61
Entrepreneurs and angels might look to so-called "independent" direc-
tors on start-up boards to protect them against VC opportunism, but it is
unclear whether a director can be truly independent if appointed by the
VC. Angel investors may be further harmed by "pay-to-play" provisions
that VCs employ, meaning that maintaining one's equity stake in the start-
up depends on continuing to make follow-on contributions. 62 Because an-
gels have historically stepped aside once VCs enter, pay-to-play provisions
could significantly diminish the angels' equity stakes.
Start-ups designed to be angel-only could look very different from a
governance perspective. One option would be to continue organizing
these start-ups as corporations, as is standard practice, but with all inves-
tors taking common stock. Traditional angels have long taken common
stock because they could not justify the transaction costs of preferred
stock.63 Angel groups, on the other hand, have begun to take preferred
stock because their pooling of resources justifies its transaction costs.64
Further, angel groups may deem preferred stock necessary to protect
against opportunism from VCs. Without VCs in the picture, however, an-
57. Id.
58. My thanks to Bill Carney for making this point.
59. For a fuller account of this argument, including literature citations, see Ibrahim,
supra note 12, at 24-27.
60. Fried and Ganor, supra note 2, at 990-91.
61. Orban v. Field, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 48, at *32 (Apr. 1, 1997) (finding no breach
of the duty of loyalty to the common shareholders because they had no legal right to receive
any portion of the sale proceeds).
62. See Robert P. Bartlett, Ii, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy
of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. Ri--v. 37, 57 (2006) (discussing pay-to-play provisions).
63. See Ibrahim, supra note 31, at 742-43.
64. Ibrahim, supra note 2, at 1450.
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gel groups could follow traditional angels and take the less expensive com-
mon stock.
Even without VCs to worry about, common-holding angels would still
be vulnerable to entrepreneurial opportunism. But, as I have argued,
traditional angels have long employed informal mechanisms for mitigating
this risk - both pre- and post-investment. 65 Angel investing is local in
nature and based on relationships. Angels prefer to invest in start-ups
founded by entrepreneurs they know or in their areas of expertise. 66 This
preexisting knowledge reduces angel uncertainty and the entrepreneur's
informational advantage. Angels also learn of investment opportunities
from business contacts.67 These contacts serve an important screening and
sorting function for angels being pitched by numerous start-ups. In addi-
tion, the close, informal post-investment relationship between angels and
entrepreneurs likely reduces angels' agency cost concerns, even without
detailed contracts.
Angels should rethink the start-up's dominant choice of organizational
form - the C corporation. In a widely cited article, Victor Fleischer ex-
plains why start-ups have long organized as C corporations despite double
taxation and the inability of shareholders to use significant corporate
losses during the early years (e.g., R&D expenses). 6 8 One reason requires
a look at the ultimate investors in VC funds. As mentioned earlier, VC
funds are limited partnerships, so any gains and losses that flow through
the start-up to the VC fund also flow through the VC fund to the fund's
limited partners. The majority of these limited partners are tax-exempt
entities such as pension funds and endowments. 69 These investors do not
care about flow-through losses because they have no tax liability to offset;
however, they do try to avoid flow-through gains, which are unrelated bus-
iness taxable income (UBTI) that can trigger an audit.70 Therefore, these
investors prefer start-ups to be C corporations, trapping gain and loss at
the start-up level. VCs will aim to please their investors, and start-ups will
aim to please the VCs. Hence the traditional preference for the start-ups
organized as C corporations.
Without VCs, however, the above-described tax rationale for organiz-
ing start-ups as C corporations would vanish. Start-ups would be free to
choose another legal form - an "uncorporation" such as an LLC - which
might be preferable. 71 In an LLC, angels could use early flow-through
losses in a start-up to offset gains from other investments. Further, using
an uncorporate form like an LLC could reduce agency costs between an-
65. See id. at 1431-34.
66. Id. at 1431.
67. Id. at 1432.
68. See Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Start-
ups, 57 TAX L. REov. 137, 142 (2003).
69. Id. at 158.
70. Id. at 158-59.
71. See LARRY E. RISTIAN, Tim, Risi; o v_ TrHE UNCORI'ORATION 227-28 (2010).
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gels and entrepreneurs, assuming that they would own the same class of
membership interests. An uncorporation would also require distributions
to angels sufficient to pay taxes on any gain attributable to the start-up,
reducing the amount of free cash on hand for entrepreneurs to squander
or misappropriate. 72 Forced payments such as distributions and interest
payments can therefore reduce agency costs.
On the other hand, an uncorporate form would be worse for successful
start-ups whose stock is held for over five years. As C corporations, the
stock of those start-ups would be subject to favorable capital gains tax
treatment under Internal Revenue Code Section 1202.73 Angels and en-
trepreneurs considering a change in the standard organizational form
should weigh these potential tax costs and benefits. The broader point of
this Section is that without VCs, angels may benefit from the possibility of
substantially decreased transaction and agency costs.
C. Advantage #3: Broader Distribution of Innovation-Based Gains
The third advantage of angel-only start-ups, as I have previously ar-
gued, is that they allow broader geographic distribution of innovation-
based gains to regions beyond Silicon Valley.7 4 While Silicon Valley pos-
sesses some of the most high-quality entrepreneurs, anecdotal data reveals
that other U.S. regions are also home to high-quality entrepreneurs who
end up relocating to Silicon Valley to be close to financing sources. 75 In
other words, not all start-ups begin in Silicon Valley, but the best ones are
likely to move there to be close to VC funding as they grow. This may or
may not be a net loss to society, but from a distributional perspective, it is
a net loss to non-tech regions looking to participate in the entrepreneurial
economy.
How can angel-only start-ups broaden distributional gains from entre-
preneurship? VCs are concentrated in high-tech hot spots, most notably
Silicon Valley, because that is where the highest concentration of entrepre-
neurs are located. 76 VCs must find entrepreneurs without undue haste
because the whole investment-to-exit cycle in a start-up must be com-
pleted in the VC fund's life.7 7 Angels, on the other hand, live throughout
72. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 U. ILL. L. Ri-v. 1169, 1204-
05 (2010).
73. See Leandra Lederman, The Entrepreneurship Effect: An Accidental Externality in
the Federal Income Tax, 65 OIO ST. L.J. 1401, 1472-73 (2004) ("[Wjith respect to the gain on
stock in a small business-already likely subject to the capital gains preference-Code sec-
tion 1202 allows non-corporate taxpayers to exclude half of the gain on qualified small busi-
ness stock held for more than five years.") (citation omitted). But see Victor Fleischer,
Taxing Founders' Stock, 59 UCLA L. Riv. 60, 69-70 (2011) (critiquing the tax benefits of
founders' stock).
74. For a fuller account of this argument, including literature citations, see Ibrahim,
supra note 31.
75. Id. at 731.
76. Id. at 746.
77. Id.
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the country78 and invest more as a hobby than a necessity. Angels do not
depend on deal flow or the highest concentration of entrepreneurs to en-
joy the less-time intensive investment-to-exit process.
Widespread angel investment allows entrepreneurs who enjoy living
outside of Silicon Valley to stay there. Angels invest locally because local
investment permits easy monitoring, and, as mentioned earlier, an impor-
tant, non-financial motivation for angel investing is the chance for routine
participation. 79 Economic development gains in new regions can follow.
If local entrepreneurs rely on angels for their first round of funding, it
delays their relocation to Silicon Valley, but may not prevent it. VCs may
ask start-ups to relocate, even after beginning somewhere else, if they wish
to receive VC funding.80 Therefore, for start-ups to stay home, they need
to have funding sources locally available. Angels serve that purpose, and,
should angel investing continue to grow, the "staying home effect" could
serve to broaden distributional gains from the innovation economy to
more regions to the extent that the companies they invest in are successful.
Successful start-ups could also attract other high-tech employees to
their regions; 8 1 these entrepreneurs might eventually spin off their own
ventures there. Similarly, the original entrepreneur might become a serial
entrepreneur and found another local start-up, or even become an angel
who funds other local start-ups. In sum, start-ups that stay home broaden
distribution of our new economy's gains, and staying home is far more
likely without VCs.
V. WARNINGS FOR START-UPS CONSIDERING THE ANGEL-ONLY ROUTE
The preceding Part explored three reasons why start-ups that can get
by on angel financing alone should consider going that route. This Part
sounds two notes of caution associated with angel-only financing. As I will
discuss, while both appear to be serious theoretical concerns, they might
be somewhat mitigated in practice.
A. Warning #1: Potential Adverse Tax Consequences for
Start-up Employees
The first potential warning for angel-only start-ups is that the absence
of VC preferred stock in the start-up's capital structure may harm efforts
to recruit new employees or to incentivize existing employees. This is be-
cause start-up employees receive common stock, or options to purchase
78. Id. at 745-46.
79. Id. at 731.
80. Ibrahim, supra note 31, at 746.
81. As of now the presence of a highly evolved labor market, in addition to a highly
evolved finance market, helps Silicon Valley continue to attract the brightest entrepreneurs.
See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rrv. 575,576 (1999).
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common stock, as an important means of compensation. 82 Existing em-
ployees, including the entrepreneur, may continue to receive new common
stock or stock options as the start-up progresses to align their incentives
with VCs. As Ronald Gilson and David Schizer have explained, employ-
ees are taxed on the fair market value of their stock or stock option
grants.83 To pay less tax, at least as an initial matter,84 employees would
likely claim that the value of their grants is low. The dilemma lies in the
fact that the VCs are paying very high amounts for their stock at the same
time employees are trying to claim that the grants they are receiving are
worth far less.8 5 It is only because VCs take preferred stock, with its supe-
rior cash flow and control rights, that such a disparity can be justified.
But, as Gilson and Schizer observe, this Silicon Valley tax strategy is not
"unassailable" - it is only "unassailed. ' '86
Would an angel-only start-up and its all-common stock (or all-one class
of LLC interest) endanger these tax advantages to employees? If angels
begin paying VC-like prices for their investments, then it is a real risk.
Employees receiving a grant of the same class of stock or stock options
during or near an angel round could no longer justify a lesser valuation.
However, there are several reasons that angel-only start-ups might not
harm employee recruitment and retention as much as might first appear.
First, as previously noted, angels typically pay less for their stock than
VCs, and therefore any higher values placed on employee common stock
would be less than if VCs moved into common stock. Second, Fried and
Ganor have observed that the IRS is becoming wise to the practice of low-
balling employee grants and is raising penalties for undervaluation. 87
Third, the low-balling practice may further wither due to the rise of secon-
dary markets for private start-up stock. As secondary sales of a start-up's
common stock increase, they offer better data for valuing new grants than
do preferred stock rounds. Electronic marketplaces for secondary transac-
tions such as SharesPost and SecondMarket serve to increase transparency
on the prices paid in these secondary sales.88 SharesPost, for example,
82. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81
VA. L. Rizv. 757, 821 (1995) ("[S]tart-ups rely primarily on stock options as a form of em-
ployee compensation .... ).
83. Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A
Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 106 HARV. L. REqv. 874, 894 (2003).
84. To avoid a large tax bill later, employees make a so-called 83(b) election under the
Internal Revenue Code and pay some tax at ordinary income rates when the grant of a non-
vested option is made. Id. at 894. When the stock is sold or stock option is exercised, addi-
tional tax will be due on the appreciation since the time of the initial grant, but at lower
capital gains rather than higher ordinary income rates. Id. at 890-91.
85. Id. at 892.
86. Id. at 892.
87. See Fried & Ganor, supra note 2, at 1017-18.
88. See Ibrahim, supra note 12, at 22.
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allows for efficient price discovery by posting detailed information about a
start-up's private stock trading on its website.8 9
In sum, angels who fund more common-stock rounds at higher valua-
tions have the potential to reduce the tax subsidy for start-up employees,
which would be a disadvantage to an angel-only start-up. Several factors
mitigate this concern in practice, however, including the fact that under-
valuation of employee grants is likely to become a more difficult practice
to justify even with VC involvement going forward.
B. Warning #2: No (or Less) Opportunity for Venture Debt
The second warning for start-ups that consider going the angel-only
route is that another (heretofore unexplored) source of start-up funding -
venture debt, or loans to start-ups - might no longer be available without
venture capital. 90 Before discussing why this is so, it is necessary to briefly
explain why we ever see venture debt, even in start-ups that do attract
venture capital.
Debt, though vilified after the financial crisis, is an important source of
financing for companies. The conventional wisdom, however, is that start-
ups will not be able to attract risk-averse lenders. 9' The typical lender pre-
fers borrowers with steady revenue streams and hard collateral, in addi-
tion to personal guarantees from the owners. This combination of
payment mechanisms reduces the possibility of default. Start-ups, espe-
cially in their early stages, appear to be poor borrower candidates in light
of these lender preferences. 92 They often spend far more money than they
make, 93 "and accounting conventions can make it difficult for start-ups to
capitalize these expenditures to strengthen their balance sheets .... 94
Further, their collateral is typically intellectual property, which is more
problematic (for collection purposes, at least). 95 Personal guarantees are
also less likely in technology-based start-ups than in ordinary small busi-
nesses because new technologies often do not prove successful. 96
89. See id. at 22.
90. For a fuller account of the venture debt industry, including literature citations, see
Ibrahim, supra note 72, at 1174-76.
91. Id. at 1170.
92. Id. at 1175.
93. Id. at 1202.
94. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Secured Credit and Software Financing, 85 CORNII.L L.
Riiv. 134, 155 (1999) ("[Current accounting conventions] make it quite hard to capitalize
expenditures on developing software. . . .The result is that a company with a substantial
investment in developing a valuable asset still might show almost no assets on its balance
sheet.").
95. Id. at 139-53 (discussing practical and legal obstacles to taking software as
collateral).
96. See Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending, 86
Go. L.J. 1, 23 (1997) (arguing that lenders demand personal guarantees from "lifestyle"
business owners).
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Despite this conventional wisdom, venture debt is a $1-5 billion dollar
per year industry, with a dedicated group of banks and non-banks special-
izing in start-up lending. 97 How are risky start-ups able to attract this
much funding? The answer is venture capital. 98 Venture lenders are con-
fident in repayment of their funds due to the deep VC pockets now back-
ing the start-up. 99 A start-up still remains unattractive from a traditional
lending perspective, but venture lenders understand that VC money sub-
stitutes for these traditional criteria.10 0 That is, venture debt "fund[s] to
subsequent rounds of equity" instead of relying on start-up revenues or
collateral, functioning similar to a bridge loan.10'
Start-ups that stick with only angels have a problem when it comes to
venture debt. As a typical rule, angels do not stage their financing as VCs
do. t0 2 If a start-up has only angel investors, then lenders will not see the
same source of repayment that exists in VC-backed start-ups. Therefore,
it follows that angel-only start-ups have foreclosed not only the venture
capital option, but also the venture debt option.
This is a real concern, but as with the tax-subsidy concern, is less severe
than it initially appears for a few reasons. First, the only start-ups that
would consider going the angel-only route are those that can get by with
less capital-i.e., those start-ups in "capital-efficient" fields such as
software and digital media. These start-ups should not need additional
funding sources such as venture debt to grow. Second, as angel investors
take on more of the funding load, they may well begin to follow on their
investments more than they do now. While traditional angels appear to
follow on their own investments out of desperation, rather than desire
(e.g., if the start-up cannot attract other funding), 10 3 angel group members
may now fund multiple rounds out of choice. If more angels begin to fol-
low on their own investments, venture debt could simply be repaid from
multiple angel rounds rather than VC rounds. Further, since the special-
ized banks that make smaller venture loans lend not primarily for the in-
terest rates, but to obtain the start-up's deposit accounts, 1° 4 their
motivation for lending would not change if the start-up were angel-only.
Finally, the Dodd-Frank Act places new registration burdens on firms that
97. See Ibrahim, supra note 72, at 1177-78.
98. Id. at 1173.
99. Id. at 1184-85.
100. Id. at 1184-89.
101. Id. at 1173.
102. Ibrahim, supra note 2, at 1422.
103. See Robert Wiltbank & Warren Boeker, Returns to Angel Investors in Groups 8
(Working Paper Series, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-
id=1028592 (angels who follow on their own investments usually receive lower returns than
angels who do not); See, e.g., Gentile v. Rossette, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 123, at *1 (angel
investor provided "continual, substantial financial support" to software start-up, without
which "the firm would have ceased to exist on any number of occasions.").
104. See Ibrahim, supra note 72, at 1182-83.
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do not invest solely in a start-up's equity securities.'I0 Venture debt funds
invest in debt securities, albeit with warrants (which might be enough to
exempt them, as warrants are a form of equity). Therefore, apart from
venture debt-specific industry concerns independent of this Article, angel-
only start-ups are less likely to need venture debt, and the ones that do
might still be able to attract it.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article began by observing that not all start-ups need venture cap-
ital to reach a profitable exit, as they might have in the past. It then went
on to detail three main reasons why start-ups that could get by on angel
funding alone should consider going that route. Finally, it sounded two
cautionary notes about the potential costs of angel-only financing.
Overall, the benefits from angel-only financing for start-ups with lesser
capital needs would seem to outweigh the potential costs. However, man-
agement of each start-up will have to weigh these costs and benefits itself
when it comes time for its next financing round. The main point of this
Article is to challenge the conventional wisdom that start-ups with the op-
portunity for VC funding should unflinchingly accept it. Start-up investors
and society as a whole may benefit from less VC investment and more
angel-only investment.
105. See Eric Alden, Primum Non Nocere: The Impact of Dodd-Frank on Silicon Val-
ley, 8 Bi'RKI -iy Bus. L. J. 107, 121 (2011).
